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Abstract
Should a provider deliver a reliable service or should it allow for occasional service
failures? This paper derives conditions under which randomizing service quality can
benefit the provider and society. In addition to cost considerations, heterogeneity
in customer damages from service failures allows the provider to generate profit
from selling damage prevention services or offering compensation to high-damage
customers. This strategy is viable even when reputation counts and markets are
competitive.
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1 Introduction
The meeting has just ended on time and you are ready to head out to the airport to catch
your flight, so you open the Uber app. After typing the destination into the ‘Where to’ box,
the app requires you to make a choice among two economy options: uberX at a price of
e50.00 or POOL at a price of e35.00, as illustrated in Figure 1. The option uberX offers
private rides, while the option uberPOOL matches riders headed into the same direction.1
Evidently, the sharing option saves costs but may increase the ride time, which creates
inconvenience and a damage if you arrive late. Which option would you select? Clearly,
the choice among the consistent service uberX and the potentially less reliable service
uberPool depends on the likelihood that other riders will join the ride, and the damage in
case you miss your flight.
The novel aspect of this service differentiation strategy is that the provider offers a
randomized service quality alongside a consistent service (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and
Berry 1988, 1985).2 Randomization as part of the business strategy is common in pricing.
Examples include probabilistic or opaque selling (Zhang, Joseph, and Subramaniam 2015;
Fay and Xie 2008), participative pricing (Chen, Koenigsberg, and Zhang 2016; Schmidt,
Spann, and Zeithammer 2014), and randomized pricing (Varian 1980). This naturally
raises the question: Can service providers and society likewise benefit from offering a
randomized service quality?
To find answers, we present a model in which a provider designs the service by
choosing the failure rate and the price. Service failures are assumed to have a dual impact:
they lead to cost savings for the provider, but they inflict damages on customers. Customer
damages from service failures may be monetary (direct follow-up costs) or non-monetary
(such as the opportunity cost of time, or hassle costs), or both.3 Clearly, reducing the
failure rate would lead to lower expected damages for customers. However, this increases
the cost of providing the service. This tradeoff between size and frequency of customer
1For details, see www.uber.com.
2United recently launched its new Flex-Schedule Program, which allows opted-in passengers to benefit
from vouchers up to $250 if they are willing to accept changes of the flight time within a given day or a
downgrade from Economy Plus to regular-old Economy (Bloomberg 2017).
3By choosing a strictly positive failure rate, the provider randomizes service quality and imposes expected
damages on its customers—a “calculated misery” (Wu 2014).
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Uber app.
damages and the cost of reducing service failures drives the optimal failure rate, and
therewith the optimal service quality. The model is used to determine the privately and
socially optimal failure rates and prices under different market conditions, captured by
(a) the cost structure (technology) of the provider, (b) the size of customer damages, and
(c) by the degree of customer heterogeneity regarding damage tolerance. In addition, the
model is used to examine optimal strategies to enhance profit by offering failure prevention
(service backups and protection plans) and monetary damage compensation.4 Figure 2
summarizes the main elements of the model.
Several key results are provided. First, randomizing service quality can be optimal for
the provider and society more broadly. Reducing the failure rate to zero is optimal and
economically efficient only if the benefit of eliminating the customer damages exceeds
the cost of fail-safing the service. Second, customer heterogeneity in damage tolerance
reinforces the incentives to retain service failures but results in an economically inefficient
4The idea of failure prevention is to address service failures before customers become aware of any
damage. For example, providers can apply fail-safing methods (poka-yokes) such as fishbone diagrams or
Pareto charts to identify and eliminate failure points (Chase and Stewart 1994). In contrast, compensation
becomes relevant once the damage has occurred, and therefore tends to be inefficient, especially when the
damage exceeds the price paid for the service.
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Figure 2: Model Elements.
outcome. Third, use of failure-prevention strategies such as backups and protection
strengthen the provider’s incentives to offer an unreliable service, whereas the optimal
failure rate is unaffected by offering an ex-post compensation strategy. Fourth, we show
that offering protection services as a form of selective service guarantee allows the provider
to tap into a new source of revenue from customers who wish to avoid damages. Finally,
competitive forces neither drive a provider of unreliable service out of the market, nor do
they lower the optimal failure rate. Hence, counter to intuition, rivalry in the market need
not necessarily improve service quality.
These results contribute to the service literature in several ways. First, we introduce
the notion of “randomized service quality” into the service quality literature (Chase and
Stewart 1994; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988, 1985; Levitt 1972). The quality of
the service is randomized in the sense that it is characterized by a Bernoulli distribution
governed by the failure rate rather than by a deterministic quality level. Our analysis
builds on the “return on quality” approach (Rust, Zahorik, and Keiningham 1995; Rust
and Zahorik 1993) and shows that eliminating service failures is not necessarily optimal.
This also fits in line with recent work that shows that there is an optimal level of service
productivity (Rust and Huang 2012) or that it may not be profitable to keep or redress
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all customers (Dukes and Zhu 2016; Ma, Sun, and Kekre 2015; Shin and Sudhir 2015).
Importantly, we extend this line of research by providing a welfare analysis that helps
managers to understand the societal impact of purposely introducing service failures
that lead to customer damages. To put the notion of randomized service quality into
perspective, it is crucial to highlight the difference to probabilistic selling, a strategy under
which the seller creates probabilistic goods using the seller’s existing distinct products or
services (Fay and Xie 2008).5 In contrast, we study design decisions of services by letting
the provider choose the failure rate and the price, but do not allow for probabilistic selling.
Thus, whenever the provider optimally decides to retain service failures, the quality of the
service is randomized.
Second, we introduce the notion of “random versioning” into the product line literature
(Deneckere and McAfee 1996; Shapiro and Varian 1996; Moorthy and Png 1992) and show
under what conditions such a sales strategy is socially harmful. The novelty is that the
provider offers services with randomized quality rather than selling different deterministic
qualities at different prices. In fact, there are instances where some customers may end up
getting a reliable service as those who actually pay for it, but pay a lower price because of
the randomized service quality. Such a probabilistic upgrade to a higher service tier is not
a possibility in traditional models of quality differentiation. Under probabilistic selling in
quality-differentiated markets (Zhang, Joseph, and Subramaniam 2015), such a quality
upgrade is possible, albeit for a different reason: By offering a synthetic service consisting
of a lottery between two distinct services, some customers with a low valuation will be
randomly assigned to obtain the high-quality service. We will show below that the notion
of random versioning is useful to provide an explanation for the probabilistic nature of the
service uberPool.
Third, by simultaneously studying failure optimization and damage control, we add to
the literature on service guarantees (Hogreve and Gremler 2009). A service guarantee is a
promise by the provider to deliver a certain level of service and offer a compensation in the
event of a service failure.6 Our key insight is that the decisions about the level of service
5Initially introduced in the context of horizontal markets, the profit impact of probabilistic selling has
recently been studied in the context of quality-differentiated markets (Zhang, Joseph, and Subramaniam
2015).
6Chen, Gerstner, and Yang (2012, 2009) study monetary compensation as a form of service recovery
under exogenous service failures.
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(the failure rate) and the design of the damage control (prevention and compensation) are
intertwined, and thus should be made together by adopting a global view in the service
planning process. Recognizing this fact helps providers to understand that the instruments
of damage control in effect become drivers of service failure—similar to costs, damages,
and customer heterogeneity.7 This third contribution is unique to the service literature
because our analysis acknowledges long-recognized differences between the nature of
service and the nature of products (Rust and Chung 2006; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and
Berry 1985). Specifically, the characteristic of “perishability”—once the time of service
passes, the opportunity to deliver the service at that time is no longer available—drives the
key differences to the literature in the product realm: Service backups (nondiscriminatory
failure prevention) and damage protection (selective failure prevention) are simply not an
option. Our paper also differs from the literature on planned obsolescence, which studies
ways to limit the physical life of durable products (Waldman 1993; Bulow 1986). We
examine the drivers of service failures and suggest economically efficient ways to manage
them.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the role of
the cost structure (technology) and the customer damages for the optimal choice of the
failure rate and the price. Section 3 extends the basic model and studies how customer
heterogeneity in damage tolerance affects the optimal design of the service. Section 4
shows when it is optimal for the provider to use a backup strategy. Section 5 shows that
marketing protection plans helps to tap into a new source of revenue. Section 6 shows how
to design the optimal compensation strategy. Section 7 studies the impact of competition.
Section 8 concludes and outlines managerial implications.
2 Optimized Service Failure
This section derives the optimal failure rate of the service and shows how it is driven by
the interplay of the cost structure (technology) of the provider and the customer damages.
We consider a monopoly provider who offers a probabilistic service that can either fail or
7More broadly, this result can also be used to explain the observed dispersion of failure rates within and
across service industries, and provide insights into the questions of why (intentionally) poor service prevails
in the marketplace (Gerstner and Libai 2006).
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Table 1: Service Outcomes.
Service delivery Outcome Probability Customer Realized
at price p damage utility
Meets expectations Success 1−q 0 v− p
Fails to meet expectations Service failure q d > 0 v− p−d
succeed to potential customers. A service failure occurs when the service does not meet
customer expectations. Conversely, the service succeeds when the expectations are met
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985). Table 1 gives an overview of the model with
probabilistic service outcomes.
The provider designs the service by choosing the failure rate q and the price p.8 The
choice of the failure rate q directly determines the reliability rate 1− q: If q = 0, the
provider offers a (perfectly) reliable service and prevents service failures. Instead, when
setting q > 0, the provider offers an unreliable service and retains service failures.
The unit cost of providing the service at any given failure rate q is c(q). We assume
that c′(q) < 0 and c′′(q) > 0, which means that reducing the failure rate is costly, and
more so the lower the failure rate is. Offering a reliable service costs c(0) ≤ ∞, which
allows for the possibility that eliminating service failures (i.e. fail-safing) is prohibitively
costly. The constant unit-cost formulation assumes that the total cost to the provider is
linear in the number of customers being served (no economies of scale).
There is a unit mass of potential customers in the market, who are identical and risk
neutral.9 Each has valuation v for the service and faces a damage d in the event of a service
failure. The preference parameters v and d are strictly positive and known to the provider.
Potential customers know the failure rate q and the price p when deciding whether to
purchase the service or choose an outside option, the utility of which is normalized to zero.
The expected utility of the service is
u(q, p) = v−qd− p.
8Ownership and control are assumed to coincide, which lets us abstract from agency issues such as
formulating quality goals for management.
9We relax both assumptions in turn below, when considering heterogeneous customers in Section 3, and
when considering risk-averse customers in Section 6.
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Thus a higher failure rate (a lower reliability rate) and a higher price reduce the expected
utility of the service. It will be useful to define v−qd as the expected service quality—a
definition that is consistent with Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry (1985), who show that
reliability is a key determinant of (expected) service quality. The service quality itself
follows a Bernoulli distribution with an ex ante known failure rate (a search attribute) and
an ex post realization (an experience attribute).10 A potential customer then purchases the
service if the price does not exceed the expected quality—even though it is possible that
the realized damage exceeds the valuation of the service.11
Optimal Decisions. The provider chooses the failure rate q and the price p of the
service in order to maximize the expected profit subject to the constraints that the potential
customers participate in the market and that q is a well-defined probability:
max
q,p
pi(q, p) = p− c(q) (1)
s.t. p≤ v−qd
0≤ q≤ 1.
It is optimal to set the price equal to the expected quality, that is, p∗ = v−qd. This allows
the provider to fully extract the surplus from the customers. The following result holds:
Proposition 1 (Optimized Service Failure). It is optimal and economically efficient to
retain service failures if −c′(0)> d and to offer a reliable service if −c′(0)≤ d.
Proposition 1 mirrors the “return on quality” approach (Rust, Zahorik, and Keining-
ham 1995): If the marginal cost to fail-safe the service −c′(0) is lower than or equal to the
customer damage d, then there is a corner solution q∗= 0 (reliable service). Intuitively, the
increase in pricing power that results from the elimination of customer damages outweighs
the higher cost of the service. Instead, if the marginal cost to fail-safe the service exceeds
the damage, then the optimum has q∗ ∈ (0,1) (unreliable service). Note that the choices
of the provider maximize welfare W (q)≡ v−qd− c(q)—the sum of profit and consumer
10The assumption that q is known to potential customers implies that the provider does not face a
reputation issue: The failure rate is a search attribute that is known prior to purchasing, whereas the delivery
itself is an experience attribute that can only be learned after purchase (Nelson 1974).
11For simplicity, we model service provision as a static (one-shot) decision, but costs and damages may
of course nevertheless be thought of as compounding all future costs and damages.
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surplus—because the surplus from the customers can be fully extracted by pricing to
expected value. The economic approach therefore shows that the “return on quality”
approach is optimal not only from the perspective of the provider but also from a societal
point of view.12
An important managerial implication of Proposition 1 is that it can be optimal for the
provider to randomize service quality rather than opting for “consistency of performance”
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988, 1985). Specifically, if q∗ ∈ (0,1), service quality
is characterized by a (Bernoulli) distribution rather than by a deterministic quality level.13
The following result shows how the optimal failure rate q∗ is affected by changes in the
business environment.
Lemma 1 (Adapting to Change). Higher marginal cost of fail-safing or lower customer
damages increase the optimal failure rate if −c′(0)> d >−c′(1).
Intuitively, a higher marginal cost to fail-safe the service motivates the provider to
increase the failure rate and thereby save costs—even though this reduces the expected
quality and thus the pricing power. Figure 3 illustrates this comparative statics result and
highlights the “fail-safing zone” where q∗ = 0. Similarly, a lower damage d increases the
expected quality and the pricing power. To counterbalance the higher pricing power, it is
optimal to increase the failure rate q∗.
Lemma 1 shows how a provider should adjust the failure rate in response to a change
in cost. To make this (implicit) dynamic process more transparent, we consider a scenario
where an existing technology c0(q) can be replaced with a new technology c1(q) at a fixed
cost F > 0. Adopting the new technology is optimal if
d(q∗0−q∗1)− [c1(q∗1)− c0(q∗0)]> F , (2)
that is, if the change in revenue net of the change in variable costs exceeds the adoption
cost F . This shows that financial benefits from restructuring may be derived from revenue
12This analysis assumes that society seeks to maximize total expected surplus, which seems plausible in
many but perhaps not all situations. Not least, randomization will create different (ex post) outcomes for
otherwise identical individuals, which may run counter to certain fairness goals, particularly when damages
are “large.”
13If q∗ = 1, the service fails deterministically and is perfectly unreliable. In essence, this is a quality-
degraded version of the reliable service.
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Figure 3: Optimal failure rate q∗ as a function of the damage d.
expansion (if q∗1 < q
∗
0), cost reduction (if c1(q
∗
1)< c0(q
∗
0)), or both simultaneously (Rust,
Moorman, and Dickson 2002).
Example. To illustrate our results, we consider the cost function c(q) = c0(1−q)2,
where c0 > 0 is the cost to fail-safe the service. If d < 2c0, it is optimal for the provider to
deliver an unreliable service (Proposition 1). The optimal failure rate is given by
q∗ = 1− d
2c0
.
This shows that a higher marginal cost to eliminate service failures, given by 2c0, leads to
a higher optimal failure rate (Lemma 1). A higher damage d has the opposite effect: It
increases the marginal benefit of reducing q and encourages the provider to incur higher
costs by choosing a lower q∗.
To illustrate the adoption of a new technology at a fixed cost F > 0, suppose that
c0(q) = c0(1−q)2 and that c1(q) = c1(1−q)2, where c1 < c0 reflects the technological
progress (efficiency gains through lower costs). Based on (2), adopting the new technology
has financial benefits for the provider if
F <
(c0− c1)d2
2c0c1
.
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Note that higher efficiency gains and higher customer damages make the adoption of the
new technology more attractive for the provider.
3 Customer Heterogeneity
This section shows that customer heterogeneity can be another driver of service failure
and give rise to socially harmful “random versioning.” To capture customer heterogeneity,
we assume that there are two types of potential customers, ‘lows’ (i = L) and ‘highs’
(i = H), who differ in their valuations vi for the service and the damages di that result
from a service failure. The expected utility of the service for type i is
ui(q, p) = vi−qdi− p,
whereas the utility of the outside option is normalized to zero. The parameters vi and
di are strictly positive, and we assume that ∆v≡ vH − vL > 0 and ∆d ≡ dH −dL > 0, so
that highs have not only higher valuation for a successful service, but also suffer higher
damage from a failure. In addition, we assume that ∆v≥ ∆d, which ensures that the latter
never dominates, in the sense that any given service with arbitrary failure rate will still
be valued more by highs than by lows. Finally, we let α ∈ (0,1) denote the proportion of
highs in the population and assume that the provider cannot observe individual types but
only knows the proportion α .
Optimal Decisions. The provider offers a segment-specific failure rate qi and price
pi, chosen so as to maximize expected profit subject to each type preferring ‘their’ offer
over the outside option (the participation constraints PCi) and the other type’s offer (the
self selection or incentive constraints ICi):14
max
{qi,pi}i=L,H
pi(q,p) = (1−α)(pL− c(qL))+α(pH− c(qH)) (3)
s.t. pi ≤ vi−qi di (PCi)
pi ≤ p j +(q j−qi)di, (ICi)
14We focus on the interesting case where it is optimal for the provider to offer a differentiated service and
sell to all potential customers. This involves no loss of generality so long as there are sufficiently many lows
in the population. Details are given in the Appendix.
11
where q ≡ (qL,qH) and p ≡ (pL, pH). Given the provider’s objective of extracting as
much surplus from customers as possible to boost profit, the relevant constraints are the
lows’ participation constraint (PCL) and the highs’ self-selection constraint (ICH), so that
these constraints will bind in the optimum. The following result holds:
Proposition 2 (Random Versioning). Offering a reliable service to customers with high
damages and randomizing service quality for customers with low damages is optimal but
economically inefficient if −c′(1)< dL− α1−α∆d <−c′(0)≤ dL.
This result is reminiscent of service differentiation in product line design (Moorthy
and Png 1992), versioning (Shapiro and Varian 1996), and damaged goods (Deneckere
and McAfee 1996). The novelty is that the provider may engage in “random versioning”:
Rather than selling two deterministic qualities at different prices, the service targeted
at lows is probabilistic. Therefore, lows may end up getting a successful service as
do highs, but pay a lower price because of the randomized service quality. Such a
probabilistic upgrade to a higher service tier is not a possibility in traditional models
of quality differentiation. Under probabilistic selling in quality-differentiated markets,
customers who purchase the synthetic service may obtain the high-quality offering with
some preannounced probability (Zhang, Joseph, and Subramaniam 2015). The difference
to our model is that the upgrade results as an implication of the pricing strategy and not
because of the service-design decision.
Engaging in randomized versioning is socially harmful. Proposition 2 shows that even
when the two drivers customer damages and cost structure themselves would actually call
for elimination of service failures (in the sense that elimination would be economically
efficient), the presence of customer heterogeneity might lead the provider to instead target
only highs with a reliable service, and lows with an unreliable service. The intuition for
the economic inefficiency is that, when customers’ valuations are privately known, the
provider can no longer extract the full surplus from customers. Rather, to keep highs from
taking the service targeted at lows, the provider must surrender a so-called ‘information
rent’ to highs. This rent can be reduced by increasing qL above the efficient failure rate q∗,
as this makes the lows’ offer less attractive to highs. The flip side of doing so is that this
not only creates a distortion of the failure rate offered to lows but also excessive expected
12
damages. If the provider were to engage in socially responsible business practices instead,
randomizing service quality for the lows might in fact be considered unethical behavior.
Proposition 2 helps to shed light on the Uber example. Consistent with our prediction,
the service uberX targeted at highs (at a high price) is not randomized: a rider is offered
a solo ride for sure (deterministic service quality). In contrast, the service targeted at
lows (at a low price) is randomized: a rider typically shares the ride but may be offered a
solo ride (randomized service quality). From the perspective of a customer who selects
the option Pool, the solo ride is a “success.” The example shows that optimizing the
failure rate through the design of the matching algorithm is definitely a core element of
the business strategy for a company like Uber.15
The next result shows how customer heterogeneity drives the adverse societal impact
of random versioning.
Lemma 2 (Calculated Misery). A larger proportion of highs or a larger difference in
damages increase the economic inefficiency and therefore the expected damages for lows.
Intuitively, an increase in customer heterogeneity motivates the provider to increase
the failure rate for lows to reduce the information rent α(∆v− q˜L∆d) that accrues to highs.
Put differently, the provider has an incentive to increase q˜L in response to a higher α or
∆d to leave less money on the table for highs. The excessively high failure rate to boost
profit therefore creates a truly calculated misery for lows.
Example. To illustrate our results, consider the cost function c(q) = c0(1−q)2 and
suppose that 0 < dL− α1−α∆d < 2c0 ≤ dL. The optimal failure rates are
q˜L = 1−
dL− α1−α∆d
2c0
and q∗H = 0,
whereas it would be economically efficient to offer a reliable service to all customers, that
is q∗L = q∗H = 0. The extent of the upward distortion is positively related to the proportion
of highs α and the difference in damages ∆d.
15The lack of data on the cost structure and customer valuations does not allow a judgement on whether
or not the marketing strategy is socially harmful.
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4 Service Backups
Service providers often use contingent planning and rely on backups to prevent customer
damages that result from service failures (Gallego and Stefanescu 2012; Biyalogorsky and
Gerstner 2004). This section shows when it is optimal to offer service backups .
We assume that the provider can purchase backups at a unit price w on a wholesale
market. In the event of a service failure, a backup can be used by the provider to
nonetheless deliver a reliable service and prevent customer damages. Effectively, this
means that the provider has some lead time to address service failures before the customers
become aware of any damage—a form of a “service guarantee.” The provider can
choose among two strategies: offer the service with or without backups, where the latter
corresponds to the benchmark case in Section 2.
Optimal Decisions. When using backups, the provider chooses the failure rate qb
and the price p of the service in order to maximize the expected profit subject to the
participation constraint of the potential customers:
max
qb,p
pi(qb, p) = p− c(qb)−qb w
s.t. p≤ v.
The provider sets the optimal price equal to the valuation of the service, that is, p∗ = v.
Consequently, the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing choice of the failure rate is
−c′(q∗b)≤ w, which again mirrors standard cost-benefit analysis: A marginal decrease in
the failure rate q increases the unit cost of the provider by−c′(q) and reduces the expected
cost of backups by w. Clearly, the optimal failure rate q∗b depends on the relative strength
of these two drivers of service failure. The following result holds:
Proposition 3 (Backups). Using service backups is optimal and economically efficient if
w < d, but increases the failure rate q∗b above the optimal failure rate q
∗ characterized in
our benchmark case (Section 2). If w ≥ d, the provider does not offer backups and the
optimal failure rate is q∗.
Proposition 3 shows that it is optimal for the provider to use backups if the wholesale
price w is lower than the damage d. If w < d, backups are economically efficient because
14
their expected costs are lower than the expected damages that would result otherwise.
Surprisingly, backups increase the optimal failure rate compared to the benchmark case.
To grasp the intuition for this result, note that the marginal benefit of reducing q is w (lower
procurement cost) with backups, while it is d (higher pricing power) in the benchmark
case. The lower marginal benefit of reducing q leads the provider to increase the failure
rate above the level that would be optimal absent service backups. Bearing this upward
distortion of the failure rate in mind is important for managers when projecting the costs
of a strategy with service backups.
Example. To illustrate the distortion of the failure rate in Proposition 3, consider the
cost function c(q) = c0(1−q)2 and suppose that −c′(0)> d. The upward distortion of
the failure rate is
q∗b−q∗ =
d−w
2c0
.
This shows that the gap in the failure rates is proportional to d−w and decreases in the
marginal cost to fail-safe the service, which is given by 2c0. The latter simply reflects the
fact that both q∗b→ 1 and q∗→ 1 as c0→ ∞.
5 Protection Services
Service backups are nondiscriminatory in that they prevent damages for all customers. In
this section, we study protection services that selectively prevent damages for customers
who have purchased a protection plan.
We assume that the provider offers a basic service at price p that fails with probability q.
In addition to the basic service, the provider markets a protection plan as an add-on to
the basic service at price f —the protection fee—that prevents service failures.16 As in
the case of backups, we suppose that the provider can address service failures before
protected customers are aware of them—a form of a selective “service guarantee.” The
key difference to backups is (besides being selective) that protection services are supplied
internally, whereas backups are procured externally on a wholesale market. The provider
faces two types of potential customers—lows and highs—as described in Section 3.
16Examples include protection plans against contingent charges such as unauthorized overdraft fees for
bank accounts or late payment fees for credit cards.
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Optimal Decisions. The provider chooses the failure rate q and the price p for the
basic service and the protection fee f to maximize expected profit subject to the constraints
that lows purchase the basic service and that highs purchase both the basic service and the
protection:
max
q,p, f
pi(q, p, f ) = (p− c(q))+α( f − [c(0)− c(q)]) (4)
s.t. p≤ vL−qdL
f ≤ qdH .
There are two sources of revenue: from selling the standard service to all customers and
from selling protection to the highs. Therefore, offering protection allows the provider to
tap into a new source of revenue from customers who wish to avoid damages.
Proposition 4 (Protection Plans). Marketing protection services is optimal but socially
harmful when the marginal cost to fail-safe the basic service is arbitrarily small.
Proposition 4 shows that the provider has an incentive to segment the market and
offer protection services even when the costs of providing a reliable basic service are
negligible. The problem of this business practice—even though it maximizes the profit
of the provider—is that it is detrimental to society: Offering a service with q = 0 at price
p = vL instead would increase welfare.17 This result shows that the incentive to offer an
unreliable service is not driven by the cost structure alone: it is the temptation to exploit
customers by extracting surplus to boost profit. Managers with a broader focus than pure
profit orientation would solve the problem at the source rather than treating symptoms
through protection plans.
Example. To illustrate, consider the cost function c(q) = ε(1−q)2, where ε > 0 is
a small but positive number. This specification entails that the marginal cost to fail-safe
the service is essentially zero, that is, c′(0) = ε . If ε ≤ dL, the optimal failure rate for the
basic service is given by
q = 1− dL−
α
1−α∆d
2ε
.
17In the limiting case where the marginal cost to fail-safe the service approaches zero, the firm offers a
basic service that fails with probability 1—the special case of damaged goods (Deneckere and McAfee 1996).
16
This failure rate is strictly positive even though it is essentially free for the provider to
offer a reliable service to all customers.
6 Damage Compensation
Instead of offering “service guarantees” that prevent failures, providers often use service
recovery strategies to voluntarily deal with customer damages that result from service
failure (Smith, Bolton and Wagner 1999).18 This section shows how providers should
design monetary compensation plans as a form of service recovery.
We assume that the provider specifies not only a price p and a failure rate q, but also
a compensation payment k that is paid to the customer in the event that the service fails.
Potential customers evaluate monetary outcomes x with a (Bernoulli) utility function u(x).
A customer obtains utility u(v− p) if the service succeeds, utility u(v−d− p+ k) if the
service fails, and u(0) from the outside option. We assume u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0 to
reflect that potential customers are risk averse.19
Optimal Decisions. The provider chooses the failure rate q, the price p and the com-
pensation payment k in order to maximize the expected profit subject to the participation
constraint of the potential customers:
max
q,p,k
pi(q, p,k) = p− c(q)−qk
s.t. (1−q) u(v− p)+q u(v−d− p+ k)≥ u(0). (5)
Optimal decision making in this setting can best be understood by looking at the
allocation of risk via p and k for a given failure rate q. For q = 0, the compensation is
irrelevant because it is never paid when the service is perfectly reliable, and it is optimal
for the provider to set p∗ = v. When q = 1, the compensation is always paid because
the service is perfectly unreliable. In this case, the compensation corresponds to a price
discount, and it is optimal to set the net price p∗−k∗ equal to v−d. At an interior solution
18There are also instances where providers are required by law to offer damage compensation. For
example, EU and US regulations specify (minimum) compensation levels for flight delays and overbookings.
19The reason for introducing both extensions at once is that compensation payments are irrelevant as long
as both parties are risk neutral. More specifically, both parties then care about p and k only via the expected
net price p−qk, so that among the many optimal combinations, there always exists one involving k = 0.
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for q, it is optimal for the provider to set k∗ = d and insure the risk-averse customers
against potential damages. To fully extract the consumer surplus, the provider sets p∗ = v.
Finally, the optimal failure is determined exactly as in the base model. Thus, the following
result holds:
Proposition 5 (Compensation). Full damage compensation is optimal whenever q∗ is
interior, that is, whenever −c′(0)> d >−c′(1). For q∗ = 0 and q∗ = 1, compensation is
irrelevant: it is never paid for q∗ = 0 and amounts to a price discount for q∗ = 1.
Proposition 5 shows that the provider may offer an unreliable service even when
potential customers are risk averse.20 Intuitively, it is cheaper for the risk-neutral provider
to deal with the consequences of service failures rather than solving the problem at the
source and offering a reliable service. The result also shows that the provider should
design the recovery strategy such that customers are fully insured against the consequences
of service failures. The funds required to compensate against service failures are implicitly
collected from the customers by charging them a higher price (v instead of v−q∗d in the
base model).
7 Competitive Markets
Up to now, we have assumed that there is a single provider in the market. In this section,
we relax this assumption to study how competitive forces affect optimal decisions about
the failure rate and the price—and whether or not firms that offer imperfect service will
be driven out of the market.
To capture a competitive environment, we consider two service providers, indexed by
i = 1,2, where each offers a single service to potential customers, each choosing a failure
rate qi and a price pi. Horizontal differentiation is a` la Hotelling, with providers located at
the extremes of the unit interval at x1 = 0 and x2 = 1, respectively. Vertical differentiation
captures the notion that service failures reduce service quality. The unit cost of provider i
is given by ci(qi), a specification that allows for cost heterogeneity among providers.
20Note that this result also holds if compensation is required by law. With damage litigation, expected
damages become a cost for the provider, which implies that the efficient failure rate is unchanged because
the total costs of failure to society at large are unaltered.
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There is a unit measure of uniformly distributed potential customers, each with unit
demand. The expected utility of the service purchased from provider i is
ui(qi, pi;x) = v−qid− τ |x− xi|− pi,
where v is the valuation for the service and x ∈ [0,1] is the potential customer’s preferred
service offering. The parameter τ > 0 measures the potential customers’s sensitivity to
horizontal mismatch |x− xi|.21 In this model of business stealing, the demand of service
provider i as a function of the failure rates q ≡ (q1,q2) and the prices p ≡ (p1, p2) is
derived from the indifference condition u1(q1, p1; xˆ) = u2(q2, p2; xˆ) as
Di(q,p) =
1
2τ
(
τ− (qi−q j)d− (pi− p j)
)
.
Hence, differences in demands among the competitors are driven by differences in failure
rates and prices.
Optimal Decisions. Provider i chooses the failure rate qi and the price pi in order to
maximize the expected profit:
max
qi,pi
pii(q,p) = (pi− ci(qi))Di(q,p).
In a Nash equilibrium, the optimal failure rate and price of provider i are given by
qci = c
′−1
i (−d) and pci = τ+ 13(qcj−qci )d+ 13(2ci(qci )+ c j(qcj)).
The optimal failure is determined by the interplay of the cost structure and the customer
damage—exactly as in the monopoly case in Section 2. The following result extends the
“return on quality” approach to a competitive setting:
Proposition 6 (Competition). It is optimal and economically efficient for provider i to
offer a reliable service if −c′i(0)≤ d and to retain service failures if −c′i(0)> d, i = 1,2.
Proposition 6 shows that competitive forces do neither drive a provider of unreliable
service out of the market nor lower the optimal failure rate. The intuition for this counter
intuitive result lies in a separability of each provider’s optimization problem: the failure
21For further details, see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992).
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rate qi is optimally used to maximize the provider’s margin per customer, whereas the
optimal sales are implemented via choices of prices pi. This result shows that the “return
on quality” approach motivates providers in a competitive market environment to choose
failure rates (and hence prices) that are optimal not only from their perspective but also
from a societal point of view. Finally, as regards to prices, notice that for symmetric firms
equilibrium prices simplify to pci = τ+ c(q
c), which illustrates firms’ ability to raise price
above marginal cost due to customer disutility from horizontal mismatch. More generally,
for asymmetric firms, prices will differ, and it can be shown that the firm with a cost
advantage captures a larger share of the market.
Example. To illustrate our results, assume that the cost functions take the quadratic
form ci(qi) = ci(1−qi)2, with ci > 0, so that there is cost heterogeneity if c1 6= c2. Then,
in competitive equilibrium, the failure rate and price of provider i are given by
qci = 1−
d
2ci
and pci = τ+
(4c j− ci)d2
12c1c2
.
These equilibrium quantities have intuitive properties: The failure rate increases in the
cost parameter ci and decreases in the damage d, exactly as in the monopoly case. The
equilibrium price decreases in the own cost parameter ci (because of the higher failure
rate) and increases in the rival’s cost parameter (because of the higher pricing power on
the captive segment).
8 Conclusion
We showed that allowing for occasional service failures can be profitable and socially
optimal for a service provider. When customers differ in perceived damages from a service
failure, it can be profitable to use a hybrid strategy under which the provider randomizes
service quality, but simultaneously offers a consistent service that is sold at a higher price
than the unreliable service. This strategy, however, can create economic inefficiencies
since the provider is motivated to retain service failures to capture surplus from customers
with high damage costs who would pay a higher price for a reliable service. As part of
such a hybrid strategy, the provider can invest in damage prevention strategies (such as
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backup and protection plans) or in less efficient monetary damage compensation (since
the remuneration is offered after damage has occurred).
The analysis provides new insights into how a provider should design a service by
simultaneously optimizing service failure and damage control. As damages incurred by
service failure increase, the willingness to pay for an unreliable service decreases, so the
provider has to lower the service price and vice versa. When the proportion of customers
who perceive high damages increases, the provider can profit by deliberately increasing
failure and damages, and then offer protection and compensation to those customers who
would prefer to pay a higher price for reliable service.
Altogether, our results on optimal service design show how the key determinants of
failures—costs, damages, and customer heterogeneity—drive the optimal failure rate and
price. The results also provide a deeper understanding of how to design the optimal failure
control. We show that—for both failure prevention and compensation—the decisions
about the optimal failure rate and the design of the damage control are intertwined, and
therefore should be made together by adopting a global view in the service-design process.
Beyond studying the profit impact, our analysis identifies conditions under which a
profit orientation is detrimental to society because it leads to excessive service failures.
This provides important new insights for managers who seek to engage in socially
responsible service design by considering both the impact of their decisions on both
customer well-being as well as on profit. Such an approach would also enable a transition
to a so-called “solution economy” (Eggers and Macmillan 2013) that solves problems at
the source rather than treating symptoms of service failures through protection strategies.
Future research could examine the impact of relaxing some of the model’s key
assumptions. On the demand side, it was assumed that potential customers know their
expected damage and that their valuation of the service and the damage are additively
separable in the expected utility function. Alternative assumptions would allow for a more
general setup—for example, one could use a multiplicative functional relationship to study
how this would impact the optimal failure rate and price. We also assumed that damages
are perfectly correlated with the valuations of the service. This assumption can naturally
be relaxed by assuming that there is an imperfect correlation instead. On the supply side,
one could study how managerial biases about costs or customer damages would affect
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optimal failure rates.22 Other assumptions that could be relaxed are that the unit costs,
the customer damages, and the extent of customer heterogeneity are observable to the
provider.
Regarding the technology, we have assumed that changes in the failure rate imply a
smooth change in cost, whereas in reality there might be step costs or other technological
constraints that prevent a smooth optimization. Incorporating more general assumptions
would make the approach less tractable (if not intractable). In practice, failure rates are
often re-optimized in the vicinity of current failures rates in response to changes in the
business environment. In this case, smooth functions should provide a good enough
approximation for the optimization of service-design decisions. Empirical studies could
test the results implied from the analysis to understand if this assumption is a good
approximation of the real world.
Future research could also study situations where the failure rate is influenced by
the customer as well—a form of co-creation of service failures and the failure rate. Our
insights help managers optimize the service process by allowing for occasional service
failures and by applying different tools of damage control. Using prevention rather than
compensation can reduce customer damages and enhance economic efficiency.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In order to fully extract the consumer surplus, the provider sets the optimal
price for the service at p∗ = v−qd. Substituting this back into the profit function (1) yields
pi(q) = v−qd− c(q). (A.1)
The necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a constrained maximum of (A.1) are:
−c′(q∗) = d−λ1+λ2, (A.2)
λ1q∗ = 0, and λ2(1−q∗) = 0,
where the λ s are nonnegative multipliers associated with the inequality constraints.
The provider sets q∗ = 0 if −c′(0)≤ d: Since λ2 = 0 , (A.2) implies that −c′(0) = d−λ1 ≤ d
(as λ1 ≥ 0 by assumption). Similarly, the provider sets q∗ = 1 if −c′(1)≥ d: Since λ1 = 0 , (A.2)
22In our model, if the provider underestimates the damages, this would result in lower (and socially
inefficient) reliability and reduced sales (and profit) as the willing to pay is overestimated.
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implies that −c′(1) = d+λ2 ≥ d (as λ2 ≥ 0 by assumption). Consequently, the provider chooses
q∗ ∈ (0,1) if −c′(0)> d >−c′(1). Since the consumer surplus can be fully extracted, the profit
of the provider coincides with welfare. Therefore, q∗ maximizes welfare and is economically
efficient.
Proof of Lemma 1. At an interior solution, (A.2) boils down to −c′(q∗) = d. Hence, the optimal
failure rate can be expressed as
q∗ = c′−1(−d).
Using the inverse function theorem,
dq∗(d)
dd
=− 1
c′′(q∗)
< 0.
Since c′′(q)> 0, the optimal failure rate q∗ decreases in response to a higher d. It can readily be
verified by inspection of Figure 3 that higher costs increase the optimal failure rate.
Proof of Proposition 2. As a preliminary step, we first establish the following claim from the
main text concerning the relevance of constraints in the provider’s optimization problem:
Lemma A1. The provider’s optimal choice of failure rates qi and prices pi must be such that
(PCL) and (ICH) bind, whereas the remaining two constraints can be ignored.
Proof. Notice first that the incentive constraints (ICH) and (ICL) jointly imply (qH −qL)∆d ≤ 0,
and thereby
qH ≤ qL, (A.3)
so that the failure rate targeted at the highs can never exceed that targeted at the lows. Now given
our assumption that ∆v≥ ∆d and given (ICH), (PCH) is satisfied whenever (PCL) is, implying that
the highs buy whenever the lows do. We can therefore ignore (PCH). Moreover, (PCL) must bind
in the optimum: otherwise, the provider can strictly increase profit (without violating any of the
remaining constraints) by raising pL and pH by equally small amounts. But then (ICH) must bind,
because otherwise profits can be raised by marginally raising pH .
Hence, the problem reduces to maximizing pi(q,p) subject to the binding versions of the
constraints (PCL) and (ICH), and subject to (ICL). The latter in turn is equivalent to (A.3) (because
(ICH) binds). Moreover, given our assumptions on the objective function, it is quickly seen that
(A.3) can in fact be ignored: the unconstrained solution will always satisfy this constraint.
23
This result implies that the optimal prices are given by pL = vL−qL dL and pH = pL+(qL−
qH)dH . Substituting these prices back into the objective (3), the problem of choosing the segment-
specific failure rates reduces to
max
qL,qH
pi(q) = (1−α)WL(qL)+α(WH(qH)−∆v+qL∆d), (A.4)
where Wi(qi)≡ vi−qidi−c(qi) is the welfare generated by any type i when purchasing the service
that is targeted at their type. Additive separability of the objective in failure rates in turn implies
that the failure rate offered to lows, qL, must satisfy
max
qL
(1−α)WL(qL)+αqL∆d. (A.5)
Following the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, the solution will involve qL > 0 if the
derivative of the objective function at zero is strictly positive, i.e. if (1−α)W ′L(0)+α∆d > 0.
Using that W ′i (q) =−di− c′(q) from the definition of Wi(q) and rearranging then establishes that
setting qL > 0 is optimal if dL− α1−α∆d <−c′(0). Using an argument completely analogous to
that made in Section 2, this will be economically inefficient whenever −c′(0)≤ dL. To complete
the proof, note that setting qH = 0 is optimal and economically efficient if −c′(0) ≤ dH , which
automatically holds whenever −c′(0)≤ dL.
As noted in the text (Footnote 14), this analysis assumes that the optimum involves serving
both customer types with a differentiated offer. Alternatively, the provider might choose to serve
only highs instead.23 The following additional result shows that this is option is irrelevant (and
hence the above analysis without loss of generality) so long as α is not too high, i.e. so long as
there are enough lows:
Lemma A2. Let αS ≡WL(qL)/WH(qL), where qL denotes the failure rate optimally offered to the
lows when both types are served. Serving both types is optimal for α ≤ αS, whereas serving only
H types is optimal for α ≥ αS.
Proof. The analysis of the case in which only highs are served is identical to that in Section 2,
in that this will involve serving highs with the offer (pH ,qH) such that pH = vH −qHdH (binding
(PCH)) and such that qH maximizes WH(qH) (the same qH as in the above case where both types
are served), which results in expected profits the size of αWH(q∗H). In contrast, when serving both
types, the optimal offer derived above yields profits (1−α)WL(qL)+α(WH(q∗H)−∆v+ qL∆d)
23A third option would be not to serve any types at all. As previously in the case of homogenous
customers, we will ignore that option. It is easy to derive parameter restrictions such that this involves no
loss of generality.
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(see (A.4)). The claim then immediately follows from comparing the two profits and simplifying
(using that ∆v−q∆d = ∆W (q)≡WH(q)−WL(q)).
The conditions under which both types are offered the same (pooling) offer are standard and
therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2. At an interior solution, the necessary and sufficient first-order condition for a
maximum of (A.5) is given by
(1−α)[−dL− c′(q˜L)]+α∆d = 0.
Hence, the optimal failure rate for lows can be expressed as
q˜L = c′−1
(
−dL+ α∆d1−α
)
. (A.6)
Since α and ∆d are strictly positive, c′(q)< 0 implies that q˜L > q∗. Inspection of (A.6) reveals
that the extent of the distortion increases in α and ∆d. Finally, note that the information rent for a
high is the difference between p∗H = vH and p˜H = vL+ q˜L∆d, given by ∆v− q˜L∆d. This implies
that the money left on the table for highs is given by α(∆v− q˜L∆d), as can be seen in (A.4).
Proof of Proposition 3. Using backups is profitable for the provider if it increases profit over the
level attained in the benchmark case. Specifically, this requires that
v− c(q)−qw > v− c(q)−qd.
Therefore, if w < d, the provider markets the service using backups and chooses qb in order to
maximize v− c(qb)−qb w, which is also economically efficient. (Note that the profit coincides
with welfare as the consumer surplus is fully extracted.) Instead, if w≥ d, the provider offers the
service without procuring backups and chooses q in order to solve (1). Using Proposition 1, it
immediately follows that q∗b > q
∗ if w < d.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the cost function c(q) satisfies the property −c′(0) ≡ ε ,
where ε > 0 is a small but positive number. Since the profit function (4) is equivalent to the profit
function (3), we can apply Proposition 2: If
−c′(1)< dL− α∆d1−α < ε ≤ dL,
then the basic service fails with probability q ∈ (0,1) and is priced at p = vL−qLdL (see proof of
Lemma 2). The protection add-on is priced at f = qdH . Service differentiation is profitable but
economically inefficient as ε ≤ dL.
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Proof of Proposition 5. The necessary and sufficient Lagrange conditions concerning optimal
choice of p and k in optimization problem (5) are:
1−λ
[
(1−q)u′(v− p)+qu′(v−d− p+ k)
]
= 0
−q+λqu′(v−d− p+ k) = 0.
Combining to eliminate λ (and using that q 6= 0 by presumption) yields u′(v− p)= u′(v−d− p+k).
Since u′′ < 0, this immediately implies equality of the arguments, and hence k= d. This establishes
that, whatever the (optimal) choice of q, the customer receives full damage compensation. Given
this, the potential customer faces no uncertainty, so that the remaining analysis proceeds exactly as
in the case above without compensation and with risk neutral customers, leading to the same failure
rate as derived there. Formally, inserting k = d and p = v, the remaining optimization problem of
the provider is exactly as above. Thus, the same conditions for an interior solution for q apply.
Proof of Proposition 6. In equilibrium, each provider i’s choice of qi and pi must solve
max
qi,pi
pii(q,p) = (pi− ci(qi))Di(q,p), (A.7)
where Di(q,p) is provider i’s demand.
To see the role of qi in this problem, consider a transformed version of the problem, where,
rather than choosing qi and pi, each provider chooses qi and vˆi ≡ v− qid− pi (the latter might
be thought of as the expected utility which the service offers to customers, net of price and
expected damage, but gross of the costs due to horizontal mismatch). To every (qi, pi)-pair, there
corresponds a unique (qi, vˆi)-pair, and vice versa, making this a proper change of variables. Now
utility obtained by a customer located at x from service i can be written as ui(vˆi;x) = vˆi− τ |x− xi|.
Importantly, fixing vˆi, customers’ utilities are independent of qi, and so is demand Di. Using this
and that pi = v−qid− vˆi from our change of variables, problem (A.7) can be reformulated as
max
qi,vˆi
pii(q, vˆ) = (v−qid− vˆi− ci(qi))Di(vˆi, vˆ j), (A.8)
from which it immediately follows that qci must maximize the first factor, v− qid− vˆi− ci(qi),
which corresponds to the provider’s margin per customer.
Having thus determined qci , we can now return to our original, untransformed problem in (A.7),
where prices are now characterized by the two first-order conditions on prices alone:
∂pii
∂ pi
= Di(qc,p)+(pi− ci(qci ))
∂Di(qc,p)
∂ pi
= 0. (A.9)
26
Assuming an equilibrium in which all potential customers are served and both firms sell positive
amounts, equilibrium demand is characterized by a customer xˆ who is indifferent between buying
from either firm, such that D1(q,p) = xˆ and D2(q,p) = 1− xˆ. Solving the indifference condition
u1(q,p1; xˆ) = u2(q2, p2; xˆ) for xˆ yields
xˆ≡ D1(q,p) = 12τ (τ− (q1−q2)d− (p1− p2)) .
Using this in (A.9) and solving yields equilibrium prices
pi = τ+ 13 d(q
c
j−qci )+ 13(2ci(qci )+ c j(qcj)),
as claimed.
It remains to be shown that a social planner who chooses qi and pi so as to maximize welfare
would choose the same failure rates qci . To see this, notice that such a planner’s problem can be
formulated as
max
q,p
2
∑
i=1
(v−dqi− ci(qi))Di(q,p)+
∫ D1(q,p)
0
xτdx+
∫ 1
D1(q,p)
(1− x)τdx.
Using the above change of variables to substitute vˆi for pi, this can be rewritten as
max
q,vˆ
2
∑
i=1
(v−dqi− ci(qi))Di(vˆ)+
∫ D1(vˆ)
0
xτdx+
∫ 1
D1(vˆ)
(1− x)τdx,
which again immediately shows that qi must maximize a provider’s margin per customer, as
claimed.24
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